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Mead: Wyoming's Experience with Federal Non-Indian Reserved Rights: The

Wyoming's Experience With Federal Non-Indian
Reserved Rights: The Big Horn Adjudication
The federal non-Indian reserved rights segment of the Big Horn adjudication is a modern example of the Shakespearean phrase, "much ado
about nothing." The controversy, born of Wyoming's attempt to finally
adjudicate and quantify all federal rights' claimed under the reservation
doctrine, took over five years and millions of dollars to resolve. The adjudication was specifically intended to eliminate disputes pertaining to
the water rights of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of the Wind River
Indian Reservation, and vast numbers of non-Indian and private claims'
within Water Division No. 3.' It was anticipated that the general adjudication of water rights would end the uncertainty experienced by water users
in Water
Division No. 3 that resulted from the possibility of large federal
4
claims.
SETTING THE STAGE

From the outset Wyoming was faced with several difficult procedural
issues. The first and foremost consideration was whether the state could
secure jurisdiction over the United States and the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes. Wyoming effectively disposed of this issue by enacting special
water adjudication legislation just one week before suit was filed. 5
The Wyoming jurisdictional statute provided that the state could adjudicate the "nature, extent and relative priority of the water rights of
1. Special Master's Report at 3, In Re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Civil
No. 4993 (5th Dist. Wyo. Dec. 15, 1982) [hereinafter Special Master's Report].
2. Special Master's Report, supra note 1, at 1, 2. Water Division No. 3 includes several
federal entities including the Shoshone and Bighorn National Forests, a portion of Yellowstone
National Park, numerous public water reserves, stock driveways and wildlife habitat. Several
thousand private defendants held an interest in 812,000 acres of ranch and farmland in the
Big Horn drainage.
3. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-501(a)(iii) (1957). Wyoming Water Division No. 3 is statutorily
defined as "all lands within this state drained by the Big Horn River and its tributaries,
and by Clark's Fork and it's tributaries."
4. Special Master's Report, supra note 1, at 8.
5. WYo. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977). That statute states:
(a) The State of Wyoming upon the relation of the attorney general may
institute an action to have determined in a general adjudication the nature,
extent, and relative priority of the water rights of all persons in any river system
and all other sources, provided:
(i) For the purposes of this section:
(A) The term "general adjudication" shall mean the judicial determination or establishment of the extent and priority of the rights to use water of
all persons on any river system and all other sources within the state of Wyoming. The court conducting such a general adjudication shall:
(I) Certify to the state board of control those legal and factual issues which
the court deems appropriate for the board to determine. Upon such certification, the board shall exercise those powers and follow those procedures set forth
in Rule 53 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure;
(II) Confirm those rights evidenced by previous court decrees, or by certificates of appropriation, or by certificates of construction heretofore issued
by the Wyoming state board of control;
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all persons in any river system. ,, 6 The
the statute as including the United
facilitated the service of process on
judicated but permitted rights in the
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term "person" was defined under
States.' In addition, the statute
the approximately 27,000 unadBig Horn drainage.8

Despite the jurisdictional effect of the statute, the United States filed
a petition for removal of the case from state court in Worland 9 to federal
district court in Cheyenne. Federal Judge Ewing T. Kerr remanded the
case to state court on the motion of the state and two private parties. 0

Judge Kerr concluded that the Wyoming jurisdictional statute fulfilled
the requirements of the federal McCarran Amendment which explicitly
waived the United States' sovereign immunity in state water adjudications."
(III) Determine the status of all uncancelled permits to acquire the right
to the use of the water of the state of Wyoming and adjudicate all perfected
rights thereunder not theretofore adjudicated under W.S. 41-211 [§ 41-4-511];
(IV) Determine the extent and priority date of and adjudicate any interest
in or right to use the water of the river system and all other sources not otherwise represented by the aforedescribed decrees, certificates, or permits;
(V) Establish, in whatever form determined to be most appropriate by the
court, one or more tabulations or lists of all water rights and their relative
priorities on the river system and all other sources;
(B) The word "person" shall be construed to mean an individual, a partnership, a corporation, a municipality, the state of Wyoming, the United States
of America, or any other legal entity, public or private;
(ii) When the potential defendants number one thousand (1,000) or more,
personal service of a summons and complaint shall not be required and (A) the
court shall order that the clerk obtain service on known potential defendants
by mailing a court-approved notice of the action by certified mail, return receipt
requested, and (B) the court shall order that the clerk obtain service on all
unknown parties by publication of said notice for four (4) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper published in each of the counties within which interests in and
rights to the use of water may be affected by the adjudication. If there is no
newspaper in one (1) or more of said counties, then publication for such counties shall be in one (1)or more newspapers published in the state, and of general
circulation within said counties. If publication is in a daily newspaper, one (1)
insertion a week shall be sufficient;
(iii) The complaint for such a general adjudication shall be captioned:
"In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
River System and All Other Sources, State of

Wyoming";
(iv) When the water rights to be determined are located in more than one
(1) county, the general adjudication may be brought in any of the counties.
6. Id § 1-37-106(a)(i)(A).
7. Id. § 1-37-106(a)(i)(B).
8. Id § 1-37-106(a)(i)(B)(ii). See Comment, McCarranAmendment GeneralAdjudications in Wyoming: Threshhold Problems, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 53 (1981).
9. Special Master's Report, supra note 1, at 17. The suit was filed in the Fifth Judicial
District of Wyoming in Worland, Washakie County. The Department of Justice filed in the
United States District Court on February 22, 1977 for removal of the case to U.S. District
Court in Cheyenne.
10. Id. at 17. The private parties who joined the state in its motion to remand to state
court were Owl Creek Ranch and Mr. Landis Webber.
11. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976) provided that the United States explicitly consented to be
joined as a defendant in state water adjudication suits when it was a necessary party. In
United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971), the McCarran Amendment was challenged and upheld. The McCarran Amendment has been the source
of court action in a number of states and has been repeatedly upheld. See, e.g., Colorado
River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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With jurisdiction established in the state court, the next procedural
issue Wyoming encountered concerned the referral of the adjudication to
the Board of Control, a procedure which is provided by statute." The
Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes objected to the Board of Control's role
in determining factual and legal issues in the adjudication. In consideration of objections raised by the Tribes, state district court Judge Harold
3
Joffe referred the adjudication to a Special Master.' The authority to
determine the status of water rights claims in the Big Horn drainage was
thereby transferred to the Special Master.' 4 When confronted with claims
in three distinct categories, Special Master Teno Roncalio trifurcated the
proceedings." The categories consisted of Indian rights on the Wind River
and non-Indian
Indian Reservation, claims of individual appropriators,
16
claims for reserved rights in federal enclaves.
Despite all this procedural maneuvering, the non-Indian federal claims
portion of the adjudication was finally determined, not by a court of law,
but by an agreement reached by the parties. 7 The Partial Interlocutory
Decree and Supporting Documents Regarding the United States' NonIndian Claims (Partial Decree) was the product of five years of negotiation.' 8 From the beginning, the United States and Wyoming were clearly
antagonistic toward each other. This enmity was reflected in their respective claims. Yet political exigencies and economic considerations forced
both parties to take to the negotiation table rather than to the courtroom.
The United States initially claimed water rights for every federal
enclave within Water Division No. 3.19 Also claimed was a reserved right
in the entire flow of Middle Creek within Yellowstone National Park. The
United States argued that these claims defied quantification." In the
Bighorn and Shoshone National Forests, the United States claimed full
natural flow rights for a wide variety of uses.2 ' Reserved rights in public
water reserves, stock driveways, water producing gas wells, wildlife
habitat and the Big Horn National Recreation Area were also claimed.
12. WYo. STAT. § 1-37-106(a)(i)(A)(I) (1977).
13. Special Master's Report, supra note 1, at 20.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Partial Interlocutory Decree and Supporting Documents Regarding the United
States' Non-Indian Claims, In Re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist.
Wyo. Feb. 9, 1983).
18. Special Master's Report, supra note 1, at 13, 26, 27. Suit was filed for the adjudication of water rights in the Big Horn on January 27, 1977. Both parties participated in prolonged motion and discovery procedures. Negotiations resulted in the entry of the Partial
Decree on February 9, 1983.
19. Id. at 1, 2. Government reservations within Wyoming Water Division No. 3 include
the Bighorn and Shoshone National Forests, portions of Yellowstone National Park, the
Bighorn Canyon National Recreation Area, the East Fork and Whiskey Basin Winter Elk
Pastures, and numerous public water reserves, water wells and stock driveways.
20. See infra note 90.
21. United States' Statement of Claims at 26-30, In Re: The General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and all Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist. Wyo. March 5, 1980).
22. Id. at 30-33.
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In its Brief In Support of its Response to the Claims for Water Rights
of the United States and the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes," Wyoming
stated, "[Our] view of the water rights owned by the United States differs dramatically from that of the United States and Tribes."14 Wyoming's
position was not understated. Preliminarily, Wyoming took the position
that reserved water rights for federal enclaves simply did not exist as a
matter of law." Wyoming then asserted that the confirmation of her constitution when it was admitted into the Union also confirmed state ownership of water.26 Finally, Wyoming contended that federal acquisition of
water through the state permit system in the past worked an estoppel
on claims to federal reserved rights.27
The antagonism inherent in water rights adjudications involving
federal claims had not gone unnoticed by Presidents of the United States.
Shortly after suit was fied in the Big Horn adjudication, President Carter
directed federal agencies holding lands which might include reserved water
rights to take action to reduce uncertainty over future assertions of
rights. 28 Agencies were instructed to seek an expeditious establishment
and quantification of federal reserved rights2 9 by handling disputes with
a "willingness to negotiate and settle such rights in an orderly and final
manner by using a reasonable standard rather than hypothetical ones." 0
A Task Force"' formed to study the conflict between state and federal
claims opined that a satisfactory accomodation of all interests could be
32
achieved.
When the Reagan administration took power in 1981, it moved to
solidify state control over water resources. Federal agencies were directed
to follow state procedures when acquiring water rights.34 Regulations of
the Department of the Interior were revised in order to eliminate conflicts
between state and federal rights. In several instances the federal government agreed to quantify its claims within a state upon request.35 Negotiations with states rather than lengthy court proceedings were clearly
mandated.
23. Wyoming's Brief in Support of its Response to the Claims for Water Rights of the
United States and the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, In Re: The General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist. Wyo. July 16, 1980) [hereinafter Wyoming's Brief].
24. Id at 1.
25. Id at 2.
26. Id at 4-7.
27. Id. at 7.
28. President's Memorandum to Federal Agencies, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1043
(June 6, 1978).
29. Id
30. Id
31. President's Water Policy Implementation Task Force 5a.
32. REPORT OF FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON NON-INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS (Draft June
1979).
33. Shupe, Water Policies of the Reagan Administration,12 COLO. LAW. 601, 602 (1983).
34. Id
35. Id
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Wyoming also had a substantial interest in avoiding court action over
federal non-Indian reserved rights. Federal claims for the Wind River Indian Reservation were Wyoming's primary concern, and it was clear that
these rights would have to be determined by a court of law.36 The legislature had appropriated a considerable sum of money for the adjudication
effort, yet this budget appeared insufficient to sustain two prolonged court
actions." A negotiated settlement for the non-Indian claims portion of
the adjudication was thought to be the preferable solution.
The Partial Decree reflects the political and legal problems encountered
by both parties during the course of the negotiations. Following a discussion of the federal reservation doctrine, this comment will focus on the
Partial Decree in the non-Indian federal rights segment of the Bighorn
adjudication. The claims and conciliations of both parties will be discussed.
The last section of this comment will explore the ramifications of the
Bighorn adjudication to the federal non-Indian reserved rights doctrine.
THE RESERVATION DOCTRINE: AN ABRIDGED DOCrRINAL ANALYSIs

The reservation doctrine has been described by at least one commentator as a "rhetorical, chimerical, phantasmagoria. ''8 Considering the
alarm that even a whisper of this doctrine arouses in water lawyers and
state legislators, this description may be apt. Although arguments have
been made which would repudiate its existence 3 9 the doctrine of federal
reserved rights occupies a permanent position in western water law.
The reservation doctrine was judicially created.40 A limited number
of cases have dealt with the doctrine yet at least six forms of the reservation doctrine exist.4

1

In simplest terms, reserved rights arise when the

United States reserves a portion of the public domain for a federal purpose which requires water. If the government exhibits an intention to
reserve unappropriated water 4for that purpose, then sufficient water to
fulfill the purpose is reserved.

1

The application of the reservation doctrine has been viewed as a
substantial threat to state and private interests. The threat is seen as
twofold. 43 First, "when the [federal] water is eventually put to use the right
of the United States will be superior to private rights acquired after the
date of the reservation .... " This may result in the destruction or impair36. For a complete case update of the adjudication of Indian rights to water in the Big
Horn drainage, see WESTERN NATURAL RESO.URCE LITIGATION DIGEST, § 12.5 (Conference
of Western Attorney Generals Winter 1986).

37. See infra note 183.
38. Corker, A Real Live Problem or Two for the Energiesof FrankJ. Trelease, 54 DEN.
L.J. 499, 500 (1977).
39. 1I at 500-501.
40. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), is attributed with establishing the
reservation doctrine.

41. F. TRELEASE,
No. 5, 1971).
42. 1I
43. 1I

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

109 (NWC Legal Study

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 9

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

ment of state acquired rights without compensation. Second, "the federal
use is not subject to state laws regulating the appropriation and use of
water."4 4

The reservation doctrine generates especially serious conflicts where
prior appropriation is the sole water law. 45 Prior appropriation is founded
on a few basic principles."6 First, beneficial use of water, not land ownership, is the basis of the right to use water. Second, an appropriation is
based on a definite quantity of water. The amount of water an appropriator
may divert is measured by the beneficial use to be served.41 Third, priority of use as determined by its duration is the basis for division of water
among appropriators when there is not enough water for all. 48
Reserved rights, however, are by their very nature unquantified and
unrecorded. 4 State water officials administering streams in prior appropriation states have no records of the existence of reserved rights, their
location, their amount, or their priority. This situation leads to considerable uncertainty as to the quantity of water available for appropriation in any drainage containing federal enclaves.50 When state water officials must rely on conjecture to certify water rights, state-granted rights
can be left unprotected against subsequent federal claims. Appropriators
cannot be assured of adequate water until reserved rights are adjudicated
and quantified. As a result, many states have begun adjudicating drainages containing federal enclaves."
The reservation doctrine was established by dicta in Winters v. United
2 An action
States."
was brought to enjoin upstream irrigators from preventing waters of the Milk River from flowing into Montana's Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation. 3 As trustee for the Indians, the United
States successfully argued that implicit in the reservation-creating Trea44. Id
45. 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 4.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967). The Western states whose
water law is based solely on prior appropriation include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
46. Id § 15.1. Prior appropriation principles originated in the early mining law of California's Sierra Nevada. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 63 Am. Dec. 113 (1855). The appropriative
right is a right of beneficial use of water based on the concept of first in time, first in right.
Though usufructuary in nature, beneficial use of water creates a property right.
47. Id § 19.2. Beneficial use has been defined as a reasonable use consistent with the
public interest in the best use of water supplies. In Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsay-Swathmore
Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (1935) the judge stated: "What is a beneficial
use, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What may be a
reasonable beneficial use, where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a
reasonable beneficial use in an area of great Scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial
use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time."
48. Id § 8.2.
49. Trelease, supra note 41, at 114, 115.
50. Id
51. For example, Colorado Water Divisions 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 are all presently involved in
adjudicating federal claims. See generally WESTERN NATURAL RESOURCE LITIGATION DIGEST
§ 12 (Conference of Western Attorney Generals, Winter 1986).
52. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Professor Trelease asserts that the reservation doctrine was
actually established as late as 1955 in Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
See F. Trelease, FederalReservedWater Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473,475 (1977).
53. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
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ty of 188811 was the reservation of water sufficient to allow the Indians
to change their nomadic ways and "become a pastoral and civilized people."55 The United States Supreme Court reasoned that Congress must
have intended to reserve sufficient water to convert the arid and valueless
land into irrigable tracts. Without water, the purpose of the reservation
to reserve
would certainly be defeated. The implied congressional 5intent
6
inference.
this
from
arose
water on Indian reservations
use
Montana's argument in Winters v. United States illustrates the
7 Monrights.
reserved
against
defense
a
as
doctrine
footing
of the equal
tana argued unsuccessfully that its admission to the Union on an equal
footing with the original states repealed any implied reservations of water
this
on government lands.18 The Winters Court perfunctorily dismissed
59
1888.
of
Treaty
the
of
argument based on its interpretation
The Winters decision did little to disrupt the smoothly administered
systems because it apaccoutrements of the state prior appropriation
60 The case that expanded the
reservations.
Indian
to
only
apply
to
peared
reserved rights doctrine to non-Indian reservations was Federal Power
Commission v. Oregon, decided in 1955.61 Though not dealing directly with
water rights, 6 FederalPower Commission v.Oregon is generally read as
holding that although the Desert Land Act of 187763 allowed settlers to
obtain patents on desert tracts provided that they intended to reclaim
the land through irrigation, the public domain was specifically excluded
appropriafrom the requirement of procuring reclamation water via prior
reservations.6 4
tion under state law. The decision was not limited to Indian commenced. 61
Accordingly, the federal-state conflict over reserved rights
54. Treaty Reserving Lands of Fort Belknap Reservation, March 1, 1888, United StatesGros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfoot, and River Crow Tribes, 25 Stat. 113 (1888).
55. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
56. Id. at 577.
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § cl. 1. See generally Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
58. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 577.
61. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
62. Id. The case merely held that a license issued by the United States to build a dam
on reserved federal lands could not be overruled by a state's lack of approval.
63. 43 U.S.C.A. § 321-39 (West 1986). Section 321 states that a citizen may "file a declaration under oath with the register and the receiver of the land district in which any desert
land is situated, that he intends to reclaim a tract of desert land not exceeding one section
by conducting water upon the same, within the period of three years thereafter... "
"The Desert Land Act contributed immeasurably to the stature and spread
of the doctrine of prior appropriation by declaring: (a) that doctrine to be the
rock upon which the right to use water on one's desert land tract should be
founded, and (b)that all surplus nonnavigable waters on the public lands should
remain free for appropriation and use of the public."
1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 20.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
64. Generally the language of Pelton Dam is construed as applying to the Desert Land
Act's severance of water from the public lands. The Pelton Dam opinion asserted that this
severance did not apply to reserved lands at all. Thus, reserved lands were assumed to have
water rights attached to them. FPCv. Oregon, 349 U.S. at 447, 448, 455.
65. Professor Trelease attests to the fact that though it is popular to attribute the precedent for the federal reserved rights doctrine to dicta in United States v. Rio Grande Irrig.
Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899), no one regarded this case as such prior to Pelton Dam. F. Trelease
FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 475 (1977).
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The subsequent decision in Arizona v. California,66which dealt with
the apportionment of the Colorado River between the states comprising
the Colorado River Compact,7 added vigor to the reserved rights doctrine
as applied to federal non-Indian enclaves. The United States asserted
federal reserved rights on an Indian reservation, wildlife refuges, Lake
Mead National Recreation Area and national forests. 8 The United States
Supreme Court recognized the implied congressional intent to reserve
water for other federal enclaves as well as for Indian Reservations.
Dicta in Cappaert v. United States69 expanded the reservation doctrine first announced in Winters. Cappaertinvolved a small fish, the Devil's
Hole Pupfish, which inhabits the pool located in the cavern of Devil's Hole
National Monument in Nevada. 0 In order for the pupfish to spawn, the
level of the pool must be sufficient to submerge a rock shelf.7" The Cappaerts were nearby ranchers whose well withdrawals resulted in the subsidence of the water level in the pool, endangering the survival of the
pupfish.
In ruling for the pupfish, the Supreme Court stated that the executive
proclamation which created the reservation12 explicitly reserved a water
right sufficient to protect the pupfish. According to Cappaert,the reservation doctrine reserves "that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more.""3 The Court set a level to which
withdrawals could be made.7 4 Though the Court characterized the water
in the pool as surface water, it stated that "the United States can protect
its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface
or groundwater. ' 75
The cases following Winters significantly expanded the reservation
doctrine to include non-Indian lands7 6 and even groundwater. 7 But this
steady expansion of federal rights was dealt a setback in United States
78
v. New Mexico.
The case arose as a result of the general adjudication of the Rio Mimbres River in New Mexico. The federal government claimed reserved water
rights in the Gila National Forest. The United States argued that the purpose of the national forest as stated in the Organic Act of 1897 79 was to
66. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

67. Colorado River Compact, 1 FED.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

tion was
1978).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

RECL. LAWS. ANN. 441 (1972).
373 U.S. 546, 595-97 (1963).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id at 132.
Id at 133-34.
Proclamation No. 2961, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1949-1953). President Truman's proclama-

issued under the American Antiquities Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
Id
Id at 142, 143.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142, 143.
438 U.S. 696 (1978).
Organic Adminstration Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 473-482 (West 1978).
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protect the watershed and to preserve the supply of timber.80 The United
States also contended that the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act
range, fish and wildlife pur(MUSYA) of 196081 added outdoor recreation,
2
poses to the Organic Act purposes.1
The Supreme Court refused to grant water for purposes enunciated
in MUSYA. The Court held that national forests exist only for the dual
purposes of the Organic Act, which are the maintenance of watersheds
and the preservation of the timber supply. 3 These primary purposes, the
Court stated, qualified for reserved rights. All other purposes were deemed
secondary, requiring the federal government to obtain rights from the
state.84
The Court's attitude towards non-Indian reserved rights was decidely hostile in United States v. New Mexico. Despite the enmity exhibited
towards the reservation doctrine, the Court's decision was somewhat
beneficial to federal rights. Prior to the New Mexico decision, a valid water
right could not be obtained simply by laying claim to water flowing
naturally in a stream. Under state prior appropriation law, a diversion
is necessary to perfect a claim.8 5 However, New Mexico supports the proposition that minimum stream flows are within the purview of the reservation doctrine if the purposes of watershed maintenance and timber
preservation require these instream flows.8 6
Law established in the reservation doctrine cases clearly affected the
substance of the Partial Decree of non-Indian claims in the Big Horn adjudication. The United States and Wyoming supported their claims with
applicable case law. 7 However, the Partial Decree was not the predictable
result that case law would mandate. Political considerations and compromise also contributed to the Partial Decree.
THE PARTIAL DECREE: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND COMPROMISES

The United States' claims of reserved rights in the Big Horn drainage
consisted of claims in Yellowstone National Park, Shoshone and Bighorn
National Forests, and claims for public water reserves and stock driveways. The federal claims pertaining to each of these four categories will
be examined in turn, along with Wyoming's defenses and the ultimate
compromise in the Partial Decree.
80. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698.
81. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-541 (West 1978).
82. Id § 528 declares that its purposes shall be supplemental to but not in derogation
of national forest purposes as set out in the Organic Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 473.
83. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 718.
84. Id at 716.
85. Meshorer, FederalReservedWater Rights Litigation,28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
1283, 1300 (1982).
86. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 716.
87. See Legal Parameters for United States Statement of Claims, In Re: The General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,
State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist. Wyo. March 5, 1980) [hereinafter United States Statement of Claims].
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Yellowstone National Park
Consistent with the line of cases holding that federal reserved rights
exist to promote the stated purpose of the reservation, the United States
sought federal reserved rights sufficient to "preserve the natural
resources, natural curiosities and the public enjoyment thereof,"' 8 in the
portion of Yellowstone National Park within Water Division No. 3. The
United States claimed consumptive and nonconsumptive reserved rights
in the Middle Creek drainage in Yellowstone National Park. It requested
a priority date of March 1, 1929, the date when this portion of the park
was withdrawn from the public domain. 9 Of particular significance the
federal government claimed the entire natural flow"0 of Middle Creek and
its tributaries."1 The United States also claimed natural flows in various
springs and seeps in the Middle Creek drainage as well as naturallevels 2
in lakes and ponds within this drainage, plus the quantity of groundwater
needed to maintain the Park in its natural state. Finally, water was claimed
93
for administrative and visitor uses.
Wyoming countered federal claims relating to the park purpose by
stating, "The reserving documents provide no support for the allegation
that this portion of Yellowstone [within Water Division No. 3] had as its
purpose, 'natural scenic condition' as alleged by the United States." 94 Instead, Wyoming delineated park purposes according to its literal reading
of the Park's enabling legislation. The act creating the Park states that
Yellowstone's purpose is "to preserve the scenic, natural and historic objects and the wildlife for public enjoyment."9 5 Wyoming interpreted this
to mean that only particular objects in the Park, and not its scenic conditions, were to be preserved.9 Wyoming's argument, based on semantics
rather than substance, is indicative of the antagonism between the parties from the outset of this adjudication.
Wyoming consistently argued for quantification of federal reserved
rights in Yellowstone National Park, as was its right under Yellowstone's
enabling legislation. In response, the government wrote:
88. Id at 17.
89. Id at 16.

90. Partial Interlocutory Decree and Supporting Documents Regarding the United

States' Non-Indian Claims at 4, In Re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist.
Wyo. Feb. 9, 1983) [hereinafter Partial Decree]. Natural flow is defined as "that flow of water

which, recognizing normal annual and seasonal variations, will occur within any natural
stream, spring, or seep as the result of the overall hydrologic characteristics of the basin,
undisturbed by the activities of man or animals, within which the natural stream, spring,
or seep is located."
91. United States Statement of Claims, supra note 87, at 18.
92. Partial Decree supra note 90, at 5." 'Natural level' is that amount of water, measured
in feet above sea level which, recognizing normal annual and seasonal variations, will exist
within any natural lake as the result of the overall hydrologic characteristics of the basin,
undisturbed by the activities of man or animals, within which the natural lake is located."
93. See supra note 90.
94. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 67.
95. Id
96. Id
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We are at a loss to understand why [you] persist in attempts
to put numbers on this infinitely complex and unique natural
system. As you know, our claim is to the natural flow, level or
yield of all sources of water in or connected to Middle Creek. You
also know that it is neither possible nor necessary to quantify or
provide the information you request in order to assess the impact
on rights held by private parties. There are, by law, no private
parties having the right to divert water from within Yellowstone
National Park.97
Wyoming eventually recognized the impossibility of quantifying claims
in Yellowstone National Park.
The Partial Decree granted the government reserved rights in the
natural flow of Middle Creek, the natural flow rights in springs and seeps,
and the natural levels in lakes and ponds in the Middle Creek drainage. 8
Further, the Partial Decree provided that the United States would not
be barred from bringing an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
to protect Yellowstone National Park from groundwater withdrawals
detrimental to the natural condition of Yellowstone National Park.9 9 The
reserved right for groundwater was also recognized as defying quantification.100
The Shoshone and Bighorn National Forests
In the Shoshone and Bighorn National Forests within Water Division
No. 3, the United States claimed federal reserved rights in the instream
flow of waterbodies."1 The United States claimed these waters in order
to satisfy the purposes of the national forests as established in the Organic
Act of 1897: to conserve watersheds and to furnish a continuous timber
supply.102 For particular streams, the United States claimed the entire
snowmelt runoff in the spring' 3 and at all other times a quantified baseflow
discharge.' 0 4 The government requested that a quantification point on each
stream be established at the intersection of the stream with the boundary
of the national forest. 0 5 Priority dates varied depending on the reservation date of the particular area of the national forest within which each
stream was located. Claimed uses were exclusively non-consumptive.
Also under the Organic Act,10 6 the United States claimed surface and
groundwater necessary for future administrative and operational uses.
97. Letter from United States Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resource Division to Michael White and David Jankowski (February 26, 1982).
98. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 86-95.
99. Id at 92.
100. Id.
101. Second Supplemental Claim of the United States of America 1-8, In Re: The General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,
State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (5th Dist. Wyo. Nov. 3, 1982) [hereinafter Second Claim].
102. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-541 (West 1978).
103. Second Claim, supra note 101, at 2, and Exhibit A.

104. Id at 3. Baseflow discharge was defined as a minimum flow and set out in Exhibit A.
105. Id. at Exhibit B.
106. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 473-482 (West 1978).
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These included domestic uses at guard stations, ranger stations, and administrative sites; growth, management, and production of timber; fire
prevention and suppression; stock water for Forest Service animals;
reforestation; and erosion control, road dust palliation, road construction
0 7
and vehicle maintenance.
Under MUSYA, 10 8 the United States claimed reserved rights for
specific quantities of water necessary to fulfill that act's purposes. These
included wildlife, fish, range, and outdoor recreation uses. A general right
enabling grazing allottees to water stock in the two national forests was
also requested under MUSYA.' °9
Wyoming conceded that the United States was entitled to reserved
rights sufficient to fulfill the primary purposes of the forests under the
Organic Act."10 This was Wyoming's only concession. The state argued
that the only additional use necessary to prevent the forest purposes from
defeat was fire prevention and control."' Wyoming insisted on precise
quantification of water used for fire prevention." 2 Citing United States
v. New Mexico, "I Wyoming termed all other claimed uses as coming within
"secondary purposes," therefore undeserving of reserved water under
the
Organic Act. Wyoming contended that secondary purposes must be satisfied through acquisition of water from the state."14
Wyoming also denied any federal reserved right to maintain stream
flows in national forests. It stated:
This claim... is an affront to Wyoming and the Court. The
purpose of the [Organic] Act, as described above . . ., demands
the delivery of water conserved by the forest to downstream users.
To secret away waters deep within the lonesome boundaries of the
national forests to suit the active imaginations of the Forest Service would utterly frustrate this fundamental forest purpose."15
Wyoming's vehement opposition to claims for the national forests forced
the United States to relinquish claims for MUSYA purposes and, to a
limited extent, claims for Organic Act purposes." 6 Full natural flow claims
in the national forests were clearly out of the question. Gains made by
the United States in Yellowstone National Park were offset by its losses
in the national forests.
107. Second Claim, supra note 101, at 4.
108. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-541 (West 1970).
109. Second Claim, supra note 101, at 8.
110. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 122 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696 (1978)).
111. I& at 123.
112. Id at 126.
113. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
114. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 130-131.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 595-597. The limited rights granted to the United
States were subrogated to state permitted rights regardless of the purpose established by
the United States.
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In all, the United States abandoned close to sixty percent of its claims
in the Bighorn and Shoshone National Forests.' Instream flow claims
were drastically reduced from the federal government's original claims.
Quantification points were moved upstream from the requested points
on the national forest boundaries." 8 With quantification points located
inside the national forests, the United States would never be able to call
the river" 9 below the quantification point. With the exception of a limited
quantified administrative use,'2 0 all decreed uses were non-consumptive
innature.
Another serious blow to United States claims in the national forests
occurred as a result of the government's agreement to the subrogation
of its rights by existing rights permitted under Wyoming law.'' Anticipated storage and reservoir projects on streams running through the
forests would also be administered as senior to the federal reserved rights.
Unspecified rights initiated under Wyoming law subsequent to the date
of the decree and having a diversion point upstream from the United
States' quantification points would also be administered as senior to the
United States' right.' An unquantified amount of water was granted for
forest fire fighting purposes, but the right was qualified so as to provide
redress to appropriators damaged by this unquantified use.'23 These limitations on the minimum rights granted in the national forests offset the
federal claims granted.
In one area, however, the federal government fared better. The Partial Decree granted the United States a reserved right to maintain natural
levels of the springs and seeps in the Bighorn and Shoshone National
Forests. Since these were to fulfill the purposes stated in MUSYA,' 4 this
marked an important inroad for the government. The spring and seep
grants were, however, limited to nonconsumptive uses which would not
interfere with previously permitted rights under state law.'2
A minimal quantity of water was granted in the national forests for
stockwatering and domestic uses.'2 6 Future discrete uses' were recognized, including the possible development by the federal government of
117. Id at 352-712.
118. Id at 357-593.
119. To "call a river" refers to the act of contacting the water division superintendent's
office, which sends out a "ditch rider" to check how much water each person is getting.
120. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 352.
121. Id at 594.
122. Id at 595-597.
123. Id at 709-710.
124. Id.at 607-608.
125. Id
126. Id at 609-613.
127. Id. at 2. A discrete use is defined in the Partial Decree as "a measurable and identifiable use of water on the Bighorn National Forest or Shoshone National Forest which use
is shown and described on the United States Forest Service's annually updated printouts
of current and foreseeable uses on land reserved from the public domain pertaining to the
Bighorn National Forest and the Shoshone National Forest. A discrete use (as opposed to,
for example, seeps, springs, instream flows, etc.) is also a measurable and identifiable use
of water on any other federal land. A 'discrete use' includes a future use of water."
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underground, direct flow or storage rights on the national forests. The
Partial Decree permitted federal government development of these sources
without compliance with Wyoming law.' 28 The priority date of these future
discrete uses was designated as the date on which the land where the use
was located was reserved as national forest. 2 9 This limitation was also
applied to the general right of stockwatering granted by the decree."10
Public Water Reserves
Congress in 1916 enacted the Stock-Raising Homestead Act,' which
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw and reserve for public
use land containing waterholes. The withdrawn public springs and
waterholes were to be administered by the BLM and were intended to prevent the monopolization of water resources. 32 The United States claimed
federal reserved rights in numerous public springs and waterholes within
Water Division No. 3.133
Wyoming contended that the water reserves in question were
tributaries and therefore exempt from classification as public water
reserves under the Colorado case of Hyrup v. Kleppe.2 4 According to
Wyoming's Hyrup test, a spring or waterhole that drains into a river is
a tributary and thus exempt from reservation as a public water reserve.
Wyoming also argued that "only important waterholes" were intended
to be reserved by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916.13 In addition, the state contended that artificial structures created to capture or
retain surface or groundwater were excluded from spring or waterhole
status. According to Wyoming, waterholes which were not demonstrably
needed for a specific present use could not be reserved. Lastly, Wyoming
time as the
asserted that no reserved right could be created until such
36
purpose.
stated
its
for
needed
was
reserve
water
public
In spite of these objections, the United States left the negotiation table
with the majority of its claims to public water reserves intact. 37 During
negotiations Wyoming dropped its assertion that public water reserves
were tributaries and therefore exempt from reservation. The state also
dropped its other arguments, on the condition that reserved rights in the
128. Id at 616.
129. Id at 619.
130. Id at 703.
131. 43 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1980) (partially repealed by The Act of Oct. 21, 1976, 90
Stat. 2787 (1976)).
132. Under the broad authority to withdraw lands for public purposes, granted to the
President in the Pickett Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 141 (1976) (repealed by The Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
90 Stat. 2792 (1976)), public water reserves were created, 43 U.S.C.A. § 300 (1976) (repealed
by the Act of October 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
133. Second Claim, supra note 101, at 9-10.
134. 406 F. Supp. 214-16 (D. Colo. 1976). The Hyrup court found that if a spring were
a tributary to a river it would not be subject to an executive order withdrawing it for a federal
water reserve.
135. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 91-92.
136. Id at 97-98.
137. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 607-08.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol21/iss2/9

14

Mead: Wyoming's Experience with Federal Non-Indian Reserved Rights: The

1986

COMMENTS

public water reserves would be administered as junior to existing permitted rights, and that future rights to waterholes and springs could only
be acquired in compliance with state water law."
Stock Driveways
Stock driveways were also established by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916.' 39 Driveways were intended to insure access by the
public to water reserves and to provide routes needed for the movement
of stock to and from summer ranges. The checkerboarding of large por40
tions of the west resulting from railroad grants' forced the establishment of stock driveways. The government condemned narrow quasieasements"" through its power of eminent domain in order to allow
stockmen to drive their livestock to and from summer and winter ranges.
The United States claimed reserved water rights on each stock driveway in Water Division No. 3 in amounts sufficient to water a designated
number of stock during the periods of the year when the driveway was
in use.' 42 These claims were necessary in order to advance the purpose
of the driveways.
Wyoming countered these claims by asserting that despite the purThe
pose of the stock driveways, no federal reserved right was 14intended.
3
Wyoming's
law.
case
with
assertion
this
state was unable to support
denial of government claims in public water reserves and stock driveways
could well have been detrimental to the state's own interests. Only the
inhabitants of the locality in which public water reserves are located
benefit from their existence. Allottees of grazing permits on public lands
frequent public water reserves today as did the first settlers. Closing public
water reserves would injure the ranching community. Apparently, Wyoming recognized this possibility and agreed to the reservation of water
for these purposes. 44 As a result, the United States came away from the
45
bargaining table with the majority of its claims in this area granted.'
FEDERAL GAINS AND LOSSES

The Partial Decree for the non-Indian claims portion of the Big Horn
Adjudication reflects the give and take of both parties involved. In some
areas of the adjudication, the United States attained a firm foothold for
reserved rights. In others, entire claims were relinquished. These gains
138. Id
139. 43 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1980).
140. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1882, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1882) which provided for construction loans and a 400 foot right of way for the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroads.
In order to further assist the financing of these railroads, the railroads were given their choice
of twenty odd numbered sections within a forty mile belt of every mile built. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 88 (1981).

141. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW 88 (1981).
142. Second Claim, supra note 101, at 9-10.

143. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 119-22.
144. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 154-72.

145. Id
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for both sides deserve particular recognition in anticipation of federal
government claims in future adjudications.
FederalReserved Rights in Natural Flows
The United States claimed the entire natural flows of the Middle Creek
system in Yellowstone National Park. The government cited dicta in
United States v. New Mexico"6 for the proposition that the express concern for the natural curiosities and biotic elements in Yellowstone's enabling legislation would allow the assertion of reserved water rights required to fulfill such purposes.147 Natural flows were claimed and granted
in Middle Creek in order to advance these fundamental park purposes.1 4 1
The Partial Decree's grant of the entire natural flow of Middle Creek
is significant for two reasons. First, by securing the natural flow, natural
lake, spring and seep levels in Yellowstone National Park, the United
States refused to relinquish water rights to state control. Congress may
impliedly reserve water pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate
the public domain under the Property Clause. 1 9 Although in the past the
federal government has generally acquiesced to state control of water
under state water law, the result in this portion of the Big Horn Adjudication illustrates that the federal government will not surrender these rights
where their existence is crucial to maintaining important public lands.
Second, granting natural flows goes well beyond the precedent of case
law, which only speaks of minimum flows. United States v. New Mexico
specifically held that a federal reservation of water should only be enough
to fulfill the primary purpose of the reservation of land. In its claim for
natural flows, the United States distinquished New Mexico on the ground
that it dealt with national forests rather than national parks.1 50
Wyoming argued that United States v. Cappaert5 applied to the
rights claimed in Yellowstone National Park, so that the reservation required only the minimal amount of water needed to fulfill the park's purpose. ' 2 Wyoming further contended that it was not Congress' intent to
preserve the features of the park inviolate. 5 3 Since no precedent specifically dealt with the national park issue, it was undoubtedly a heated source
of debate during negotiations. Granting full natural flows to the United
States in Yellowstone Park was assuredly not the result of case law
analysis. Natural flow rights were simply insisted upon by the United
States.
146. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
147. Statement of Claims, supra note 87, at 17 (citing New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 709-11).
148. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 86, 87.
149. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). The Cappaert court stated,
"Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8 which per-

mits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3 which
permits federal regulation of federal lands."

150.
151.
152.
153.

Statement of Claims, supra note 87, at 17.
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Wyoming Brief, supra note 23, at 67.
Id. at 69.
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One explanation for the Partial Decree's recognition of natural flows
for Yellowstone National Park becomes clearer if the adjudication of nonIndian claims is viewed as a whole. Though the United States' claims for
Yellowstone were granted in their entirety, claims in the national forests
were gutted. 54 The overall settlement indicates that the United States
secured its claims in Yellowstone National Park at the expense of the national forests.'55
The United States will undoubtedly assert similar claims in future adjudications when water rights in national parks are involved. Full natural
flow rights may therefore become common.
Federal Reserved Rights in Groundwater
The Partial Decree also granted the United States groundwater suf56
ficient to maintain Yellowstone National Park in its natural condition.'
The groundwater granted was recognized as unquantifiable. Since its
origin as a reserved rights issue in Cappaert,'57 groundwater has remained
an extremely controversial area. Although most states have enacted
groundwater legislation, reserved rights in groundwater are exempted
from state control in the same manner as surface rights. Federal reserved
rights in groundwater may detrimentally affect the hydrology of an area
should consumptive uses be granted by a state. As a result, the states
and the federal government have been engaged in an ongoing debate as
to whether Cappaertprovided for federal reserved rights in groundwater.'58
Granting groundwater rights to the United States in Yellowstone National
Park was an important result because it suggests that the reservation
doctrine applies to all water sources.
Recognition of MUSYA Purposes
Although United States' claims in the Bighorn and Shoshone National
Forests were dramatically reduced, and any rights granted were all but
nullified by subrogation to state rights, the national forest issue did result
in an advance for the federal government. In United States v. New Mexico, MUSYA purposes 59 were termed "secondary" and immaterial to the
1897 Organic Act priority date. However, in spite of this case, the United
154. See supra text accompanying notes 101-30.
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
157. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
158. Using virtually the same language as the CappaertCourt, the Partial Decree held
that "nothing in this Decree shall be deemed to bar the United States from bringing an ac-

tion in any court of competent jurisdiction to protect Yellowstone National Park from ground-

water withdrawals detrimental to the natural condition .... Partial Decree, supra note 90,
at 92. Cappaertheld that "the United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion whether the diversion of surface or groundwater." Cappaert,426 U.S. at 143. Since the

Cappaert court referred to the water in Devil's Hole Pool as surface water, a strong argu-

ment may be made as to whether a reserved right in groundwater was substantiated by the
language of the case.
159. 16 U.S.C.A. § 528 (West 1978), established the policy that national forests are
established for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed and fish and wildlife purposes.
See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 969, 713 (1978).
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States secured its claims to the natural levels of springs and seeps for
purposes stated in the Organic Act and MUSYA. No priority date was
stated because such rights were expressly limited to those which would
not interfere with existing permitted rights under Wyoming law.
Though narrowly limited to spring and seeps, incorporating Organic
Act and MUSYA purposes in one category was important to the United
States. This result indicates that where no detriment to state appropriators exists, Organic Act purposes may not be as strictly construed
as was previously inferred from the United States v. New Mexico decision. Subsequent withdrawals by state appropriators which would contravene MUSYA's fish, wildlife and outdoor recreation purposes would
be actionable by the United States.
WYOMING's GAINs: NATIONAL FOREST LIMITATIONS

Clearly, the federal government was not the only party to suffer losses
and celebrate gains during this adjudication. When Wyoming initiated
suit, its goal in this portion of the adjudication was a final settlement of
non-Indian claims. The state accomplished this. Also to Wyoming's benefit
was the reduction of United States claims in the national forests. Wyoming managed to strictly limit all national forests claims.
Although Wyoming eventually acknowledged and agreed to federal
claims in Yellowstone National Park, the tables were turned when the
focus changed to the Shoshone and Bighorn National Forests.160 The United States asserted blanket claims to natural flows for purposes beyond
those of the Organic Act. 6' Relying on United States v. New Mexico,
Wyoming maintained that only the Organic Act should support water
withdrawals. Wyoming succeeded in reducing United States claims to the
6
minimum necessary to prevent the defeat of Organic Act purposes.
Wyoming narrowly interpreted United States v. New Mexico in
reference to this issue. 63 Yet, Wyoming did agree on a reserved instream
64
use to conserve water flows and furnish a continuous supply of timber.
New Mexico has been interpreted by some courts as a complete
denial
16
of an instream flow in the national forests under any priority.
In order to further strip federal rights, Wyoming insisted on a clause
which subrogated federal rights to present and future state permitted
rights. 6 6 During years when sufficient water exists in the drainage, this
clause would not be injurious to United States claims. Theoretically,
however, during years of drought holders of state permitted rights senior
to federal rights would be able to divert waters from high in the national
160. See supra text accompanying notes 110-23.
161. 16 U.S.C.A. § 528 (West 1978).
162. Id
163. Wyoming's Brief, supra note 23, at 122-31.
164. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 353-93.
165. See, e.g., United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1983); Note,
The Limits of FederalReserved Water Rights in NationalForests, 19 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 71 (1984).
166. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 594.
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forests to satisfy their needs downstream. In such a situation, the federal
right granted in the Partial Decree would be completely worthless.
As a practical matter, any diversion works developed by state water
users to acquire waters flowing through the national forests would have
to cross federal lands. It is undisputed that the Property Clause67 gives
the United States the power to "protect its lands, to control their use and
to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights to them. 16 8 The
United States' power to grant or deny a right-of-way for diversion purposes would effectively bar the exercise of state permitted water rights
detrimental to federal reserved rights. The United States' willingness to
agree on the subrogation of its reserved rights was certainly affected by
the power to allow or foreclose the placement of diversion works on the
public land.
This consideration is also worthy of note in discussing the location
of quantification points for the reserved water in the national forests. The
United States originally requested that quantification points be located
on the intersection of the stream with the national forest boundary. These
quantification points were moved up the stream into the national forests
in the Partial Decree. The movement of the quantification points was
calculated to prevent the United States from demanding its granted flow
at the park border. Downstream from the quantification points, state appropriators could theoretically divert water for their permitted use.
However, once again appropriation by state users would be dependent
on their ability to divert water within the national forests. The United
States could deny a right-of-way for diversion
across the national forest
'6 9
for the purpose of "protecting its lands."'

Normally, the movement of quantification points upstream would prevent a call on the waters of the stream. However, in the Big Horn and
Shoshone National Forests, federal reserved rights were subrogated to
state approppriative rights. The United States would have no opportunity to call the stream whether quantification points were moved or not.
Wyoming's strategy in relation to the national forests was to make
United States rights as ineffective as possible. Undeniably, the state accomplished this goal. By limiting water to Organic Act purposes, by
subrogating federal rights to state appropriative rights and by moving
quantification points upstream, Wyoming theoretically divested the
United States of all water in the national forests of Water Division No.
3. Of course, the United States has the inherent power to nullify these
state gains.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

The Partial Decree in this segment of the Big Horn adjudication contained a section entitled, "Future Litigation."' 70 Under this heading, the
167. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

168. Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
169. Id.
170. Partial Decree, supra note 90, at 4.
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parties agreed that the stipulation and agreement "shall not be used as
precedent in any other adjudication of federal water rights.",' 71 In spite
of this clause, however, the United States has already begun using the
example of the Big Horn Adjudication in negotiations arising out of other
adjudications. 7 This stipulation may also help states in their negotiations with the federal government because it indicates that the United
States may relinquish claims in some areas where the law is uncertain.
In other contexts, the federal government will give up nothing.
Further, the example of the Big Horn adjudication suggests that
United States claims will not be unreasonable. Perhaps the value of this
adjudication lies in the defusing effect it may have on the reservation doctrine controversy.
CONCLUSIONS

The Big Horn adjudication of non-Indian water rights amounted to
"much ado about nothing." The federal reservation doctrine remains unchanged as a result of this adjudication. Wyoming's gains attributable
to this experience were minimal. Private appropriators were for the most
part unaffected, and the water continues to run in the Big Horn drainage
system.
The reservation doctrine provided a basis for federal claims in the
federal enclaves within Water Division No. 3. The Partial Decree, which
was the product of an agreement of the parties, adds little to clarify the
often confused and controversial reservation doctrine. Nothing novel or
extraordinary resulted from this adjudication.
Reserved water rights granted in this adjudication generally were
derived from earlier case law. For example, groundwater rights granted
in Yellowstone National Park resulted from the interpretation of Cappaert,'73 which applies the reservation doctrine to both surface and ground74
water. However, this interpretation has not been universally accepted.'
The result in the Big Horn Adjudication suggests that groundwater rights
may indeed attach to reserved surface rights in extraordinary circumstances such as those existing in Yellowstone National Park.
The agreement which provided for a limited instream flow in the
Bighorn and Shoshone National Forests also was derived from reservation doctrine case law.' Although the general trend has been to interpret New Mexico narrowly, the result in this adjudication indicates that
the case may be interpreted to allow instream flow rights consistent with
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., In Re: Application for Water Rights of the United States for Water Rights
in Water Division No. 3, State of Colorado, No. 79CW85 (10th Dist. Colo. Dec. 20, 1979);
In Re: Application of the United States for Water Rights in Water Division No. 2, No. 81CWll
and 81CW12 (12th Dist. Colo. 1979).
173. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
174. J. Little, Administration of Federal Non-Indian Water Rights, 27B RoCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 1709, 1762 (1982).
175. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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the purposes established under the Organic Act.1 6 Such rights have been
construed to apply only for watershed maintenance and timber management purposes. In order to accomplish these purposes, limited administrative rights will be allowed.'
The state contested federal reserved rights claims for public water
reserves and stock driveways on a limited basis. Public water reserves
and stock driveways serve a beneficial purpose to state users. Their establishment under the Stock Raising Homestead Act'78 is undisputed.
These federal water institutions were created by statute rather than by
judicial interpretation of congressional intent. Public water reserves and
stock driveways hold a solid position in the law of federal water rights.
Wyoming's gains in this adjudication were more theoretical than practical. Ostensibly, Wyoming completely stripped the United States' claims
in the Shoshone and Bighorn National Forests. However, the practical
effects of the subrogation agreements, 79 as well as the positioning of quantification points,""o are minimal when considered in the light of the federal
81
power to control the public lands.1
The Big Horn adjudication also had little effect on state appropriated
water rights. Holders of permitted but unadjudicated rights were not
threatened by the assertion of federal reserved rights. Their rights were
2
adjudicated and granted in an almost summary manner. 8
At the commencement of the Big Horn adjudication, the Wyoming
legislature appropriated six million dollars to the Attorney General's Office for costs of the adjudication.8 3 To date, nearly eight million dollars
have been spent on the project. 84 Although the portion of the adjudication discussed in this comment represents a small part of the entire project, the cost to the state for these extremely limited returns is inordinately
high.
Wyoming's first experience in an adjudication of this magnitude involving large federal claims indicates that the state's returns from its
substantial outlay of money will be minimal and of little consequence to
state appropriated rights. Sufficient water existed at the outset of the
adjudication for all users in the Big Horn drainage basin. And despite
the clamor, the expense and even the result, the water still flows in the
Big Horn drainage.
KATHERINE LAMERE MEAD
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